Arnett v. Kennedy - A Dubious Approbation of Adverse Action Procedures by unknown
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 7
Arnett v. Kennedy - A Dubious Approbation of
Adverse Action Procedures
Copyright c 1974 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Arnett v. Kennedy - A Dubious Approbation of Adverse Action Procedures, 16 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 153
(1974), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss1/7
COMMENTS
ARNETT v. KENNEDY-A DUBIOUS APPROBATION OF
ADVERSE ACTION PROCEDURES
Embodied within the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912' and subse-
quent Civil Service Commission regulations 2 is an explicit proce-
dure, designated "adverse action, ' ' 3 by which a nonprobationary
federal employee in the competitive civil service may be removed
from his position, reduced in rank or pay, or suspended without pay
for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."' Here-
tofore considered the product of legislative grace during an era in
which federal employees were deemed both privileged to receive
career positions and without a concomitant right to retain them,'
this statutory removal procedure has become subject to much criti-
cism6 due to its alleged failure to provide employees with sufficient
1. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
2. 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.202(a)(1), 752.202(b), 752.203, 771.208 (1973).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(2) (1970).
4. Id. § 7501(a). The Act provides:
(a) An individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended
without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.
(b) An individual in the competitive service whose removal or suspension with-
out pay is sought is entitled to reasons in writing and to-
(1) notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him;
(2) a copy of the charges;
(3) a reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges, with
affidavits; and
(4) a written decision on the answer at the earliest practicable date.
Examination of witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required but may be provided
in the discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension without
pay. Copies of the charges, the notice of hearing, the answer, the reasons for and
the order of removal or suspension without pay, and also the reasons for reduc-
tion in grade or pay, shall be made a part of the records of the employing agency,
and, on request, shall be furnished to the individual affected and to the Civil
Service Commission.
These requirements have been modified in the employee's favor by a series of Civil Service
Commission regulations which require 30 days advance notice of a proposed removal, 5 C.F.R.
§ 752.202(a)(1) (1973), allow the employee to appear personally, id. § 752.202(b), and permit
appeal of any adverse decision to either the Civil Service Commission or the employing
agency, id. §§ 752.203, 771.205, 771.208.
5. For a discussion of the history of civil service legislation, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S.
Ct. 1633, 1641-42 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Berzak, RightsAccorded Federal EmployeesAgainst Whom Adverse Personnel
Actions Are Taken, 47 NoTRE Dam LAw. 853 (1972); Chaturvedi, Legal Protection Available
to Federal Employees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U.L. Rv. 287 (1968); Merrill,
Procedures For Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. Ray. 196 (1973).
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protection against unwarranted disciplinary action by their supervi-
sors. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the pur-
ported procedural shortcoming in Arnett v. Kennedy,7 in which the
constitutionality of disciplinary action was challenged on the
ground that the failure of the procedure to provide federal employ-
ees with a full evidentiary hearing before an impartial hearing ex-
aminer prior to removal8 deprived the employee of the due process
guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Two specific issues required
the Court's attention: whether the Lloyd-LaFollette Act grants fed-
eral career employees a "liberty" or "property" interest in their
continued employment which falls within the purview of the fifth
amendment's procedural due process protection,' and, if so, whether
the precise removal procedures set forth in the Act and attendant
regulations protect the liberty or property interest sufficiently to
satisfy the due process guarantees of the fifth amendment."'
With the Court unable to assume a unanimous position on any
single aspect of the problem, a mere plurality of the Justices joined
to uphold the current adverse action procedure" in an unusually
complex decision expressed in five separate opinions. Since complex
decisions are susceptible to misinterpretation and improper appli-
cation, the relationship among the plurality, concurring, and dis-
senting opinions in Kennedy must be examined carefully; proper
analysis of the opinions will indicate that the case may have only
limited value as authority to uphold adverse action procedures that
7. 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974).
8. Accused employees currently have access to an evidentiary hearing only at the appeal
stage after removal under either the Civil Service Commission's regulations, 5 C.F.R. §§
771.208, 771.210-.212, 772.305 (1973), or particular agency procedures, e.g., Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity Staff Instruction No. 771-2 (1971); 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1970).
9. The right to due process of law under the fifth or fourteenth amendment is not all-
inclusive, it "attaches" only upon a deprivation of an employee's rights to "liberty" and
"property" as they relate to his job. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972)
(due process attachment under fourteenth amendment). Thus it is the nature of the interest
involved which invokes due process protections rather than a balancing of the interest of the
individual against those of the government employer. Id. at 571. See notes 18-25 infra &
accompanying text. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
10. This second issue was also one discussed in Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564,
569 (1972). See notes 18-25 infra & accompanying text. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
In Kennedy the standard for removal, "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service," see note 4 supra & accompanying text, also was challenged in the district court as
vague, overbroad, and thus unconstitutional on its face, Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp.
863, 865 (N.D. Ill. 1972), but the district court's determination that the clause was insuffi-
ciently precise was rejected by the Supreme Court. Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 1649
(1974).
11. 94 S. Ct. at 1636-39.
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fail to track precisely those available under the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act.
The Interest Created by the Act
In Kennedy a nonprobationary employee of the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity (OEO) was removed from his position pursuant
to the statutory adverse action procedure after being accused of
making recklessly false statements about a superior. 12 In accordance
with established Civil Service Commission and OEO regulations,
the employee, Kennedy, was given notice of the proposed adverse
action and was informed of his right to reply. Kennedy elected to
forgo a reply, since the supervisor he had criticized was to preside
over the subsequent proceedings, and chose instead to challenge the
validity of the removal procedure in court. The maligned supervisor,
acting on behalf of the OEO, then terminated Kennedy and in-
formed him of his right to appeal. 3 Kennedy instituted suit in fed-
eral district court seeking relief from the alleged governmental in-
fringement without due process of law upon his "liberty" and "prop-
erty" interest in continued employment, asserting a right under the
fifth amendment to both a full evidentiary hearing and an impartial
hearing examiner in the evidentiary proceeding prior to removal. 4
A three-judge district court issued summary judgment for Kennedy
and ordered him reinstated-with full backpay.15 The OEO appealed
this decision to the Supreme Court which reversed, 6 a three-Justice
plurality holding that the Act created no interest to which due pro-
cess attached while two other Justices concurred in result on the
basis that the removal procedures under the Act comported with
fifth amendment due process.17
12. A field representative in the Chicago Regional Office of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, Kennedy allegedly accused Wendell Verduin, the Regional Director, of having
attempted to bribe a representative of a community organization by offering him $100,000 in
return for signing a statement adverse to Kennedy's interests. 94 S. Ct. at 1636.
13. 94 S. Ct. at 1636-37.
14. Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
15. 349 F. Supp. at 866. The three-judge court was used in conformity with the statutory
requirement of convoking a three-judge panel whenever an injunction is sought against the
enforcement of an act of Congress on constitutional grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970). In
Kennedy an injunction was sought against the OEO to restrain it from enforcing the Lloyd-
Lafollette Act which was argued to be unconstitutional.
16. Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974).
17. The five Justices united to approve the removal procedure although proffering dif-
ferent reasons in support of that position. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality which
included Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, held that a federal employee's statutory
right under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act to be removed only for cause does not create in him a
1974]
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In the landmark companion cases, Board of Regents v. Roth" and
Perry v. Sindermann,1' the Supreme Court previously had aban-
doned expressly the concept that government employment was a
privilege to which the fifth amendment protections could attach
only when the interests of the employee outweighed those of the
government.20 Rather than a balancing process, the initial decision
property interest within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Id. at 1649. Therefore, since
the fifth amendment's procedural due process requirement had nothing to which to attach,
the plurality needed only to determine that Kennedy was removed in accordance with estab-
lished procedures to rule in favor of the OEO. Concurring in the result only, Justices Powell
and Blackmun filed a separate opinion in which they contended that the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act does grant federal employees an expectancy ofjob retention to which the fifth amendment
procedural safeguards attach. After examining the adverse action procedure, however, these
Justices decided that the Act and attendant regulations complied with the due process re-
quirement despite the inability of federal employees to demand a pretermination evidentiary
hearing before an impartial examiner. Id. at 1649-52.
The remaining four Justices accepted the proposition that nonprobationary federal employ-
ees hold a property interest in their continued employment and agreed among themselves
that the safeguards against arbitrary removal afforded such employees do not give them the
full protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Id. at 1659, 1671. They were unable to
concur, however, on what additional provisions are required to conform the Act and attendant
regulations to the requirements of procedural due process. Agreeing that the Act was not
unconstitutional on its face, Justice White would have been satisfied if an accused employee
could appear before an impartial hearing examiner prior to removal, while Justices Mar-
shall, Douglas, and Brennan would demand a full evidentiary hearing as well as an impartial
decisionmaker prior to removal or suspension. Id. at 1680.
18. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
19. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
20. In Roth the Court stated: "[We have] fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction
between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the application of procedural due
process rights." 408 U.S. at 571 (footnote omitted). Prior to the Roth decision an employee
was held entitled to a specific due process protection only when his employment interest was
deemed more important than the government's countervailing interest in remaining free from
such an additional burden. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). For an illustration of the balancing-of-interests test in
operation, see 29 WAsH. & LEE L. Rav. 100, 105-10 (1972).
The classification of government employment as a privilege was reflected by Judge Holmes'
often quoted statement near the turn of the century: "The petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). The last significant
application of the right-privilege distinction occurred in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46
(D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), in which a govern-
ment employee was summarily dismissed from her job without being afforded the opportunity
to know or refute the evidence upon which the removal was predicated. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the dismissal while noting: "Due process of law
is not applicable unless one is being deprived of something to which he has a right." Id. at
58.
The first notable exception to the distinction was the "doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions." See, e.g., Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of Higher
Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). See also Comment, Constitutional Rights of Public Employees:
Progress Toward Protection, 49 N.C.L. REv. 302, 304 (1971). Although since applied to gov-
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as to whether due process attached therefore was to be made by
determining whether the employee had a "liberty" or "property"
interest that would be infringed by termination. If so, then the fifth
amendment due process protections were to be invoked, a balancing
of the interests being performed, after the initial issue of attachment.
was resolved, to determine the specific content of the due process
required in a particular instance.2 '
eminent benefits other than employment (Lefkowitz v. Turley, 94 S. Ct. 316 (1973)(govern-
ment contract); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972)(liquor license); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)(unemnployment benefits); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (taking of bar examination)), the
doctrine was created to protect civil service employees from being disciplined for participa-
tion in activities specifically sanctioned by the Constitution, particularly the first amend-
ment. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966). In Welman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952), the first case to utilize this doctrine, an Oklahoma statute requiring a
loyalty oath of all state employees was held unconstitutional when a state college professor
was discharged pursuant to the statute because he exercised his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination during the course of Senate subcommittee hearings. The doctrine
has retained its vitality, as evidenced by the Supreme Court holding in Cole v. Richardson,
405 U.S. 676 (1972), that government employment may not be conditioned upon an oath to
refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech, and has been used to prohibit the
removal of schoolteachers for constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
A second exception to the right-privilege distinction was recognized subsequently by the
Supreme Court in 1959 in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). The petitioner in Greene
was an aeronautical engineer whose security clearance was revoked without his being given
an opportunity to contest the action by confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses.
Indicating that a federal employee, under some circumstances, may have a liberty or property
interest in his continued employment to which fifth amendment protectionsoattach, the Court
stated: "The alleged property is petitioner's employment; the alleged liberty is petitioner's
freedom to practice his chosen profession." Id. at 492. The Court failed to reach the merits
of the constitutional argument, however, and chose to rule in favor of the employee by finding
the revocation to be an ultra vires act: "[In the absence of explicit authorization from either
the President or Congress, the respondents [Secretary of Defense and others] were not
empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the
safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination." Id. at 508.
Despite its suggestion in Greene that a right to government employment may exist, the
Court nevertheless upheld a similar dismissal two years later in Cafeteria Workers Union
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), in which the security clearance of a shortorder
cook at a naval gun factory was revoked summarily, no opportunity having been given the
cook to dispute the revocation. This apparently contradictory decision occasionally has been
cited as support for the proposition that the Government may always summarily terminate
employment absent explicit statutory protection of the employee. See, eg., Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 1643 (1974). It should be noted that, in Cafeteria Workers, by determin-
ing whetlier procedural due process protections attached to the employment interest through
a process of balancing the interests of the Government against those of the individual on a
case-by-case basis, the Court necessarily implied that such an interest protected by due
process could yet exist in government employment in cases where the employee's interests
are held to be of greater weight.
21. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 & n.8 (1970).
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The Kennedy opinions affect most directly the creation of a lim-
ited property interest by a statute. It was asserted in Roth that for
a government employee to have a property interest in continued
employment, he must have an "entitlement" to his job and not
merely a unilateral expectation of retention.2 This entitlement can
be created in several ways, including: (1) the employee may have a
vested right to continue employment, absent cause for dismissal,
arising from either a contract 2s or state or federal statutes;2 or (2)
an entitlement may arise whenever a right to receive benefits is
contingent upon the satisfaction of certain objective criteria and the
claimant meets those standards.2s Neither Roth nor Sindermann,
however, addressed the related: issue of whether a statute granting
an entitlement can simultaneously provide an employee fewer pro-
cedural protections for his property interest" than the fifth amend-
ment dictates.
Both Roth and Sindermann discussed principally the attachment issue. Roth concerned
purportedly untenured college professors teaching at state-supported institutions, who, upon
not being rehired for another academic year, sought judicial relief by alleging deprivation of
a constitutionally protected right to renewal without the benefit of procedural due process.
Applying the theory that government employees may have or accrue a property or liberty
interest in their continued employment, to which it had alluded in Greene, see note 20 supra,
the Court held in Roth that an untenured professor holding absolutely no expectation of
renewal did not have a property interest in reemployment embraced within the meaning of
the fifth amendment. 408 U.S. at 567. Roth was hired under a one-year contract renewable
at the option of both parties, but under the applicable state tenure statute he would be
serving "during efficiency and good behavior" only after having completed four years of
employment. Roth was dismissed after his first year on the job and thus had no tenure.
Conversely, in Sindermann, the Court found that fifth amendment procedural due process
protections would attach if the professor was able to demonstrate that he was operating under
a de facto tenure system which gave him an expectancy of renewal. Sindermann had been
working as a state college teacher for 10 years when he was dismissed. Although the state had
no formal tenure system, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to allow Sindermann
to prove his allegations that a de facto tenure system existed by virtue of published rules and
understandings. 408 U.S. at 599-603.
22. 408 U.S. at 576-77.
23. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972). See also Connell v. Higginbotham,
403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971).
24. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). The majority in in Roth said an entitlement is "defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law."
25. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26. Beyond an assertion in dictum by Justice Rehnquist that Kennedy's liberty interest
was not infringed so long as he was afforded an opportunity to clear his name, 94 S. Ct. at
1646, the various Kennedy opinions did not attempt to explicate further the liberty interest
concept. For a termination of employment to be deemed a deprivation of an employee's
liberty interest under the analysis set forth in Roth and Sindermann, it must either seriously
damage the employee's reputation or substantially foreclose his future employment opportun-
ities. 408 U.S. at 573-74. See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
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The plurality in Kennedy held that the employee was not entitled
to a pretermination evidentiary hearing before an impartial hearing
examiner, regardless of whether fifth amendment procedural due
process ordinarily requires such a procedure, since it found that
Congress, through the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, did not create in fed-
eral employees a property right to which all of the fifth amendment
protections attach. Justice Rehnquist, rejecting the district court's
view, saw nothing in the fifth amendment prohibiting Congress
from "granting protection against removal without cause and at the
same time . . specifying that the determination of cause should
be without the full panoply of rights which attend a trial-type adver-
sary hearing. ' 'r This conclusion that Congress intended to grant
federal employees less than a whole right was supported by a finding
that Congress, when adopting the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, was as con-
cerned with avoiding unduly burdensome procedural requirements
on federal agencies as it was with providing job security for employ-
ees.Y
Although subsection (a) of the Act, standing alone, contains the
necessary language to bring the full range of fifth amendment pro-
Cognizant that most terminations influence prospective employers to some degree, the Court
in Roth limited attachment of due process to those situations casting a serious stigma on an
employee's record and noted that a termination which merely renders an employee "some-
what less attractive" to prospective employers is not so potentially harmful that procedural
due process attaches. 408 U.S. at 574.
In Arnett v. Kennedy the employee alleged that the manner in which his dismissal was
effected violated his liberty interest because it was predicated upon allegations of dishonesty
that would seriously damage his reputation. 94 S. Ct. at 1645. Although the plurality did not
find Kennedy endowed with a right to which procedural due process protections could attach,
Justice Rehnquist asserted in dictum that prerequisite to any finding of deprivation of liberty
without due process of law was dismissal unaccompanied by an opportunity for the accused
to clear his name. He then stated that Kennedy suffered no deprivation, for the administra-
tive appeal procedure is in "sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 1646. The concurring opinion simply noted that the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
comported with due process with respect to Kennedy's liberty interest for the same reasons
that it complied with due process with respect to his property interest. Id. at 1652. No
discussion of the liberty issue was necessary in the dissenting opinions of Justices Marshall
and White inasmuch as both found the Act's procedures to be unconstitutional with respect
to Kennedy's property interest. Id. at 1660, 1672. One argument that Kennedy might have
advanced was that he had a liberty right to be free from patently arbitrary or unfair govern-
mental action to his detriment absent an extraordinary need for such governmental action.
See also note 47 infra & accompanying text. This liberty interest seems no more attenuated
than the freedom to pursue one's chosen profession implicitly recognized in Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). While such a liberty right might not require a pretermi-
nation evidentiary hearing, it very well might require a pretermination right to reply before
an impartial heating examiner.
27. 94 S. Ct. at 1643.
28. Id.
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tections into play,2" the plurality read this section in conjunction
with the specific procedures enunciated in subsection (b) and deter-
mined that Congress intended to limit the application of fifth
amendment procedural due process to the procedures specified
therein:
[Tihe very section of the statute which granted [the em-
ployee] that right. . .expressly provided also for the procedure
by which "cause" was to be determined, and expressly omitted
the procedural guarantees which appellee insists are mandated
by the Constitution. Only by bifurcating the very sentence of
the Act of Congress which conferred upon appellee the right not
to be removed save for cause could it be said that he had an
expectancy of that substantive right without the procedural lim-
itation which Congress attached to it. In the area of federal
regulation of government employees, where in the absence of
statutory limitation the governmental employer has had vir-
tually uncontrolled latitude in decisions as to hiring and firing,
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy. . . . we do not believe that a
statutory enactment such as the Lloyd-LaFollette Act may be
parsed as discretely as appellee urges."
This analysis appears vulnerable on several fronts. At the outset,
its reference to Cafeteria Workers appears unwarranted since that
decision relied upon the balancing-of-interests test subsequently
discarded by the Supreme Court in Roth.3 Moreover, although the
plurality's reading of the two subsections as a unit conferring a
limited right is reasonable, another interpretation is possible.
Subsection (a) may be read as conferring a substantive right to
which the full array of procedural due process protections attach,
and subsection (b) may be regarded as a congressional attempt to
specify how the guaranteed elements of procedural due process are
to interrelate and be exercised. According to this interpretation
subsection (b) does not impose limitations on subsection (a), it is
merely explanatory and must meet fifth amendment standards of
procedural due process.32 The reasons behind the enactment of the
provision further undermine the plurality's bald assertions that
29. See note 4 supra.
30. 94 S. Ct. at 1643, citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
31. See note 20 supra.
32. 94 S. Ct. at 1672.
33. Although placing its assertion regarding the intent of Congress in the context of a
discussion of preceding Civil Service provisions, 94 S. Ct. at 1641-42, the Court apparently
relied on speculation alone to fathom legislative intent in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act since it
referenced no contemporary statement of that intent. See 94 S. Ct. at 1642.
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subsection (b) was intended to limit subsection (a). At the time of
its enactment in 1912, constitutional due process was not deemed
protective of governmental employment since employees were con-
sidered privileged to hold their positions without a right to expect
continued employment.34 Rather than limiting the constitutional
protections applicable to disciplined federal employees, Congress
just as readily may be presumed to have been providing civil serv-
ants with procedural safeguards which they had not enjoyed pre-
viously. Congress may well have been concerned that federal em-
ployees were not receiving sufficient protection, rather than receiv-
ing so much that the system would be unduly burdened absent some
restriction.
Notwithstanding the plurality's argument, 5 six Justices found
that subsection (a) of the Act creates a right to continued employ-
ment for nonprobationary federal civil service employees, absent
cause for dismissal, a right to which fifth amendment procedural
due process protections attach.-6 Despite being divided over whether
the Act and attendant regulations meet the standards of procedural
due process, each of these Justices found support in Roth for the
proposition that statutes granting government employees job secu-
rity absent cause for removal create a property interest to which due
process attaches.3
34. See note 20 supra.
35. Besides its speculation regarding legislative intent, the plurality also denigrated Ken-
nedy's attempt to challenge the Act, noting the "elementary rule of constitutional law that
one may not 'retain the benefits of an Act while attacking the constitutionality of one of its
important provisions.'" 94 S. Ct. at 1644, citing Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 255 (1947),
citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940). Pursuant to this line of reason-
ing, employees are not permitted to claim a right to employment, absent a showing of cause
for removal, under subsection (a) of the Act while questioning the constitutionality of the
procedures set forth in subsection (b) which were felt to limit the right created by subsection
(a). Concluding that the substantive right was "inextricably intertwined" with the Act's
procedural provisions, the plurality decided that "a litigant in the position of appellee must
take the bitter with the sweet." 94 S. Ct. at 1644. Although this argument lends support to
the plurality's limited-interest argument, even Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the
maxim of constitutional litigation has been ignored as often as followed in other cases. Id.
36. For the conclusion of dissenting Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan regarding
attachment, see 94 S. Ct. at 1672; for the decision of Justices Powell and Blackmun, concur-
ring in result, see id. at 1650; for the dissenting opinion of Justice White, see id. at 1655-56.
See also note 71 infra.
37. The Court reiterated in Roth that a statute granting government employees security
absent cause for removal creates a "property" interest to which due process attaches. 408 U.S.
at 577-78. This statement in Roth was probably never intended to represent an absolute rule,
however, because the Court was not faced in Roth with an apparent itatutory limitation to a
section creating a property right. Justice Stewart, who wrote the opinion in Roth which relied
upon this principle, was a member of the plurality in Kennedy which found an exception to
it. 94 S. Ct. at 1645.
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This solidarity was marred, however, by reliance upon unpersu-
asive arguments. Justice Marshall, addressing the plurality's con-
tention that a right created by statute may be limited by that stat-
ute, cited several cases in which the Court previously had found a
property interest protected by the due process clause" and asserted
that "[i]n none of these cases did the Court consider a statutory
procedure to be an inherent limitation on the statutorily created
. . .property interest."39 Justice Marshall failed to note, however,
that in none of these cases did the statute which created the prop-
erty right also provide the procedure for its termination.
Another of the arguments raised against the plurality also was
flawed. Justice Powell, referring to the plurality's rationale in his
concurring opinion, stated: "[Justice Rehnquist's view] miscon-
ceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right
is conferred not by legislative grace but by constitutional guaran-
tee."4 This statement may reflect a misunderstanding of Justice
Rehnquist's position. Justice Rehnquist did not claim that the right
to due process springs directly from the statute involved; he merely
adduced that the right to due process attaches, in the absence of a
contract, only if Congress creates a property interest. 1
Although neither the plurality's argument that no attachment
occurs nor the affirmative position of the concurring and dissenting
Justices is overwhelmingly convincing, it appears that at the pres-
ent time six Justices have determined that subsection (a) of the Act
invokes the procedural due process protections of the fifth amend-
ment. In light of the inability of these Justices to adopt a uniform
position concerning whether the Act and its accompanying adminis-
trative regulations comply with the requirements of procedural due
process, careful attention must be given to each faction.
Determining the Constituent Elements of Due Process
Although the specific elements of procedural due process may
38. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver
held entitled to driver's license under statute providing for its issuance); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance recipients found entitled to welfare benefits where
statute deferred eligibility).
39. 94 S. Ct. at 1672. Justice Rehnquist would distinguish these cases as dealing with areas
of the law dissimilar to government employment and therefore inapplicable because "[t]he
types of 'liberty' and 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause vary widely, and what
may be required under that clause in dealing with one set of interests which it protects may
not be required in dealing with another set of interests." Id. at 1645.
40. 94 S. Ct. at 1650.
41. Id. at 1643.
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vary in particular cases, 42 the Supreme Court consistently has re-
quired the presence of two minimal safeguards for a disciplinary
action to satisfy the demands of due process. It has become axio-
matic that no deprivation of a protected interest may occur unless
the party affected is furnished adequate prior notice of the proposed
government action. 3 (Clearly satisfied by the procedures under the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act,4 this requirement was not at issue in
Kennedy.) In addition the deprivation of a protected interest may
not be effected without the divested party being afforded an oppor-
tunity to be heard 5 "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." 48 Thii "meaningful time" has been interpreted by the
Court, in the absence of an extraordinary governmental need for
summary action,47 to mean a time "before petitioner is condemned
to suffer grievous loss."4"
The specific requirements of a meaningful hearing in any particu-
lar situation are determined by balancing the interests of the ad-
verse parties." Through this process both the opportunity to pro-
duce and cross-examine witnesses"' and to present arguments before
an impartial hearing examiner" previously have been held to be
important components of a meaningful hearing. In Kennedy the
42. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971), the Court said that "[tihe formal-
ity and procedural requisites... can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests
involved . . .", and in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), it stated
further that "[tihe very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation."
43. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
267 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965).
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 7501(b)(1) (1970).
45. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373
U.S. 96 (1963).
46. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
47. An extraordinary need for summary action has been found to exist where the Govern-
ment claimed an interest in seizing and destroying allegedly rotten food without prior notice,
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908), and where the Government
claimed an interest in seizing a yacht allegedly carrying contraband drugs, Astol Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4693 (U.S. May 15, 1974).
48. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
49. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
50. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,
428 (1969); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
51. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Winnick v. Manning, 460
F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
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appellee's claims52 that the absence of an opportunity to present and
cross-examine witnesses rendered the pretermination hearing of-
fered by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act less than meaningful met differ-
ing responses. Five Justices found no merit in his plea: and plurality
simply held that procedural due process did not attach and never
reached this issue,5s while the two Justices concurring in result bal-
anced the interests of the respective parties and determined in the
Government's favor that the Act's procedures were sufficient.54 The
remaining four Justices perceived the balance of interests to lie in
Kennedy's favor. All four determined that the absence of an impar-
tial hearing examiner rendered the removal process unconstitu-
tional; three of the four deemed a pretermination evidentiary hear-
ing essential to procedural due process.55
This diversity of opinion, presented in five separate statements,
results from the differing weights given the employee interests and
the ill effects presumed to flow from the removal procedure. Empha-
sizing the disastrous effects that wrongful removal could have on an
employee, 6 even though subsequently reinstated on appeal, Justice
Marshall gave the employee's interest great weight and found a
pretermination evidentiary hearing to be an essential element of
procedural due process. Although noting that a wrongfully removed
employee receives, upon reinstatement, the full backpay he lost
during the disciplinary period,57 Justice Marshall argued that this
52. 94 S. Ct. at 1637.
53. 94 S. Ct. at 1644, 1646. A case very helpful in speculating how the Justices of the
plurality would have balanced the interests in Kennedy had they found due process to attach,
is Sampson v. Murray, 94 S. Ct. 937 (1974), in which a determinative question was whether
the federal district court should have granted a stay of administrative action pending a
federal employee's administrative appeal. The Court decided the issue by balancing the
interests of the Government against those of the individual employee. As in Kennedy, Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, wrote the opinion for the
Court, predictably finding the Government's need for removal of the employee to be superior
to the employee's interest in remaining on the job.
54. 94 S. Ct. at 1652. Justice White agreed with Justices Powell and Blackmun, concurring
in result, that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was not required, id. at 1667, but agreed
with the dissent that an impartial hearing examiner was required at the pretermination stage,
id. at 1668.
55. See notes 70-71 infra & accompanying text.
56. 94 S. Ct. at 1677.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (1970) provides that an agency employee, if reinstated on appeal,
"is entitled, on correction of the personnel action, to receive for the period for which the
personnel action was in effect an amount equal to all or any part of the pay. . . that the
employee normally would have earned during that period if the personnel action had not
occurred, less any amounts earned by him through other employment during that period
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payment may come too late to prevent the employee from suffering
an unwarranted hardship during the perhaps lengthy period be-
tween removal and reinstatement." He further noted that extended
unemployment becomes more acute in light of the fact that a dis-
charged federal employee often cannot obtain employment in the
private sector,5" is usually ineligible for unemployment benefits
since the removal was premised on cause," and consequently may
be forced to resort to welfare benefits during the pendency of his
appeal. Balanced against this hazard to wrongfully dismissed em-
ployees was the increased strain on governmental efficiency of a
pretermination evidentiary hearing.12 Unpersuaded, however, that
this greater burden outweighed the potential benefit inuring to em-
ployees from pretermination evidentiary hearings,8" Justice Mar-
58. More than one-half of all appeals take longer than three months to complete. Merrill,
Report in Support of Recommendation 72-8, Procedures for Aduerse Actions Against Federal
Employees, 2 REcOMMENDATIONS AND Rrors or Ta ADMUIsTRA'iVz CONsnnnNcE or nrE
UNrr=n STATES, 1006, 1014 (1972).
59. Obtaining private employment is difficult for two reasons: first, an employer in the
private sector will be reluctant to hire a discharged government employee knowing that if the
employee is successful upon his pending appeal, he will return to his government job, and,
second, there is a widely held notion that government employees are extremely hard to fire,
hence an assumption that anyone who is fired is likely to be an undesirable prospect for
employment in the private sector. Id. at 1015.
60. See Christian v. Department of Labor, 94 S. Ct. 747 (1974).
61. Justice Marshall cited three reasons why reliance upon welfare is not satisfactory. First,
the employee may, in order to become eligible for benefits, have to liquidate and exhaust all
of his assets. Second, many people would decline welfare, finding it degrading and humiliat-
ing. Finally, the level of subsistence provided by welfare is so minimal that "painful and
irremediable personal as well as financial dislocations" may result. 94 S. Ct. at 1677. He
concluded by asserting that reliance upon the welfare system to prevent serious suffering by
the discharged employee is a "gross insensitivity" for "[t]he costs of being forced, even
temporarily, onto the welfare [rolls] because of a wrongful discharge from tenured govern-
ment employment cannot be so easily discounted." Id.
62. 94 S. Ct. at 1678-80. It should be noted that one evidentiary hearing presently is
available under Civil Service Commission regulations at the appeal stage. 5 C.F.R. § 752.203
(1973). In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 n.14 (1970), the Court indicated that due
process does not require two hearings.
63. 94 S. Ct. at 1677-79. Justice Marshall supported this contention by noting that during
recent years the Court had held pretermination hearings to be required by due process in the
governmental taking of interests other than employment. In 1969 the Court held unconstitu-
tional a Wisconsin garnishment procedure which allowed a creditor's lawyer to have half of a
debtor's wages frozen by simply serving him with a summons issued by the clerk of the court,
even though the debtor could have his wages unfrozen at a later hearing, Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and in the following year the Court found a noneviden-
tiary hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits to be insufficient to satisfy due
process in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), despite the recipient's ability to obtain a
full evidentiary hearing after the termination of benefits. But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
A Georgia statute was held not to satisfy due process in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
because it failed to allow an evidentiary hearing before the revocation of a driver's license,
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shall concluded that Kennedy's right to procedural due process was
infringed by his removal under the existing procedures. 4
Justices Powell and Blackmun, concurring in result, did not deem
discharged federal employees to be so helpless during the interim
between removal and appeal. In contrast to the dissenting Justices,
they appraised the removed employee's distress as consisting of
nothing more than a temporary interruption of income" and found
mitigating circumstances to exist since "a public employee may well
have independent resources to overcome any temporary hardship.""6
Moreover, the concurring Justices found the Government's interest
in possessing the prerogative to remove quickly disruptive employ-
ees to be substantial, 7 because, as the Government contended, this
summary removal power is necessary to maintain efficiency and
discipline 8 and a mandatory pretermination hearing would increase
administrative costs." Thus weighing the adverse interests, Justices
even though it subsequently could be restored at a trial-type hearing. Likewise, in Fuentes
v. Shevin, 402 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court struck down a Florida procedure for summary
replevin because it failed to provide a prior evidentiary hearing. Justice Marshall argued that
the interests taken in these other cases were no more significant than the interest infringed
in Kennedy.
64. He drew support from Fuentes to buttress this conclusion:
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense and it is
often more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But
these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right. . . .Pro-
cedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all
possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the persons
whose possessions [or property] are about to be taken.
94 S. Ct. at 1678, quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 n.22 (1972).
65. 94 S. Ct. at 1652. They did not find the deprivation to be as severe, however, as that
suffered by the petitioner in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which the Court
determined that a termination of welfare benefits without a prior evidentiary hearing was
unconstitutional due to the recipient's "brutal need" for the funds, id. at 261.
66. 94 S. Ct. at 1652. Justice Powell's distinction is undoubtedly valid in many cases where
a discharged public employee has independent resources upon which to rely while he is
deprived of income temporarily. In many other cases, however, the employee may not have
sufficient independent resources to carry him through the temporary deprivation of income.
Justice Powell's distinction is therefore of limited validity. He seemed not to consider the
possibility that the removal from public employment, like the termination of welfare benefits,
may come in the face of "brutal need." Justice White, on the other hand, appeared more
cognizant of how severe the consequences of a temporary deprivation of income can be, but
he disagreed with Justice Marshall on the utility of the welfare system as a means of providing
the employee with a minimum base of support while his appeal was pending. 94 S. Ct. at
1667-68.
67. 94 S. Ct. at 1651.
68. Id. at 1651, 1679.
69. 94 S. Ct. at 1651. Regulations currently in effect, however, prohibit the Government
from removing the employee for 30 days after the start of the removal process. See note 4
supra. A report by Professor Robert Merrill for the United States Administrative Conference
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Powell and Blackmun decided in favor of the Government that the
existing procedures met the requirements of procedural due pro-
cess.70
Not only must a complaining party demonstrate that his interests
outweigh those of government in order to prevail on a due process
challenge, it appears that he also must persuade a court that the
procedural protections demanded would enhance significantly the
fairness of the controverted proceedings. It was on this point that
Justice White differed from Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Bren-
nan. Whereas Justice White concluded that Kennedy's removal was
improper because he was not provided an impartial hearing exam-
iner,7" the other three dissenting Justices found the balance of inter-
ests to lie so heavily in the employee's favor that the impartial
examiner should be required to conduct a full evidentiary hearing
before termination since the availability of such a full hearing would
increase substantially the fairness of the removal procedure.
Only a Battle, Not the *War
Reduced to their lowest common denominator, the five separate
opinions filed in Kennedy uphold the constitutionality of the exist-
indicated that delays in the appeal procedure are caused by inefficient scheduling, not by
lengthy hearings. Merrill, supra note 58, at 1017, 1056-57, 1060. Justice Marshall concluded
that "there seems little reason why a hearing could not be held during that thirty-day period
[after notice and before removal]." 94 S. Ct. at 1679. The notice requirement would not
necessarily be an impediment to holding the hearing within 30 days. Justice Marshall seemed
to have overlooked, however, the potential difficulties in having all necessary witnesses ap-
pear within the 30-day period. This problem could be very troublesome for the employing
agency if the employee to be discharged knows that removal is not possible until he has
received an evidentiary hearing, since in that situation he may attempt to delay the hearing
as long as possible.
70. 94 S. Ct. at 1652. Justice White also found a pretermination hearing to be unnecessary,
basing this decision partially upon his contention that the wrongfully removed employee "is
not totally without prospect for some support during the period between the pretermination
and final hearing on appeal .... [Hie may get some form of employment in the private
sector, and, if necessary, may draw on the welfare system in the interim." Id. at 1667-68.
71. 94 S. Ct. at 1665-66. Justice White had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that
an impartial hearing examiner was required at the preremoval stage. 94 S. Ct. at 1665-66.
He did not find the adverse action procedure under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act to be
unconstitutional, however, since, even though the Act did not mention an impartial decision-
maker as a requirement, he assumed that Congress would have intended such a requirement
had it considered the possibility that, as in Kennedy, the hearing examiner would have a
personal adverse interest in the employee's fate. Id. at 1666. By use of such a fictional reading
of legislative intent, Justice White implied that a failure of the Act to provide for an impartial
decisionmaker would raise constitutional problems. Id. Thus Justice White joined the concur-
ring and other dissenting Justices in the belief that the ultimate test of the Act's procedures
was the Constitution rather than merely subsection (b) of the Act itself.
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ing adverse action procedure by a slender five-to-four margin, the
lack of a uniform rationale among the opinions emphasizing the
likelihood that Kennedy perhaps would not be followed were even
a slightly different state government employee removal statute to
be challenged. The plurality of three, ruling that the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act grants federal employees only a limited expectation
of job retention to which procedural due process protections do not
attach, was joined by two Justices who held that the full array of
protections does attach, but deemed the adverse action procedure
to be in compliance with the fifth amendment despite its failure to
provide the two protections demanded by Kennedy.
The Kennedy opinions may be less significant for their approba-
tion of adverse action under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act than for their
rejection of the plurality's argument that a statute can limit the
entitlement it creates. Six Justices very clearly found that a statute
creating an expectation of job retention absent cause for removal
conferred upon the employee a property interest to which due pro-
cess attached such that government cannot effect a deprival of that
property interest without affording the employee due process. 2 Al-
though the six disagreed concerning the content of the due process
to be afforded, they uniformly found that the procedures were to be
measured against a constitutional standard, rather than against an
ad hoe standard imposed by the Act.73 Inasmuch as the determina-
tion of the constituent elements of constitutional due process, once
it has attached, necessitates a balancing of the interests, it is unsur-
prising that the six Justices found diverse consequences to flow from
the creation of a protected property interest.
Contrasting the relative solidarity of the six Justices on the at-
tachment issue with their lack of agreement on the results of the
balancing process indicates that Kennedy will provide only weak
authority for upholding other termination procedures that may
work even a slight shift in the balance of conflicting interests. In this
regard the positions taken in concurrence by Justices Powell and
Blackmun may be determinative. Crucial to their approbation of
the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was their minimization of the harm to the
employee's interest worked by temporary deprivation pending rein-
statement.71 Where the employee had an interest not so easily mini-
mized, Justices Powell and Blackmun could reach a different result
72. See notes 17, 71 supra.
73. See notes 17, 71 supra.
74. See notes 65-70 supra & accompanying text.
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in the balancing process; such a case might be presented by a re-
moval procedure affecting exclusively lower echelon workers less
likely to have "independent resources"75 to tide them over a tempo-
rary deprival of income, particularly if the removal procedure failed
to provide for an expeditious opportunity for reinstatement by a
showing that the removal was improper because without proper
cause.
The availability of a post-termination evidentiary hearing also
was crucial to the concurring Justices 6 Had such a hearing not been
available, it seems likely that they at least would have joined Jus-
tice White's call for the decision regarding the need for a pretermi-
nation evidentiary hearing to be made by an impartial examiner,77
rather than by a supervisor with a potentially hostile interest in the
employee's fate.78 Whether use of an impartial decisionmaker is
necessitated would be determined as a part of the balancing of
interests to specify the content of the process due under the consti-
tutional mandate. Because less would be required administratively
to provide such an impartial decisionmaker than to conduct a full-
scale pretermination evidentiary hearing merely upon the em-
75. 94 S. Ct. at 1652.
76. See id. at n.5 (stating Justice Powell's reasons for not adopting Justice White's resolu-
tion of the case).
77. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act does not prescribe an evidentiary hearing at the pretermina-
tion stage, but instead allows one under subsection (b) at the discretion of the hearing
examiner: "Examination of witnesses... is not required but may be provided in the discre-
tion of the individual directing the removal or suspension without pay." 5 U.S.C. § 7501(b).
It is patently clear that the choice of hearing examiner is the key to effective procedural due
process under the Act.
A statement by Justice Marshall in support of his contention that a pretermination eviden-
tiary hearing was necessary to produce a fair proceeding is persuasive: "IThe discharged
employee should be afforded an opportunity to test the strength of the evidence of his miscon-
duct by confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses and by presenting witnesses in
his own behalf, whenever there are substantial disputes in testimonial evidence." 94 S. Ct.
at 1674. Nevertheless, any requirement that employees have an opportunity to test the evi-
dence against them should be limited to those situations in which there are substantial issues
of fact which can be decided better when witnesses are produced. Justice White at leastwvould
have an impartial decisionmaker determine when a pretermination evidentiary hearing is
required. Id. at 1666. See note 71 supra.
78. Kennedy had been charged by a superior with making reckless accusations concerning
the superior. See note 12 supra. This same official served as hearing examiner during the
adverse action proceedings and in this capacity made the decision that a pretermination
hearing was unnecessary. 94 S. Ct. at 1665. Whenever a presiding hearing examiner is simul-
taneously defending his own reputation during the proceedings, it is difficult to ignore the
appearance of bias even if the hearing is in fact conducted in an impartial manner. Due to
the holding derived from the plurality and concurrence in Kennedy, however, the inability
of federal employees to appear before an impartial decisionmaker prior to termination has
been perpetuated as a weakness in the adverse action procedure.
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ployee's demand, Justice White's proposal would seem to accord
better with the balancing performed by the concurring Justices than
would the extensive procedures favored by Justices Marshall, Doug-
las, and Brennan. 9
Once the five separate opinions are studied carefully, Arnett v.
Kennedy is not the defeat for all government employees that the
plurality opinion might portend. However inequitable the particular
result may seem which allows a hostile supervisor to determine
whether the employee should receive a pretermination evidentiary
hearing, the Kennedy opinions will not provide blanket authority
for upholding even approximately similar state or local adverse ac-
tion procedures. A clear majority reaffirmed the existence of a pro-
tected property right in certain employment as indicated by Roth
and Sindermann. Moreover, the same majority of six rejected the
plurality's argument that a statute could impose its own standard
of due process. The constituent elements of due process will con-
tinue to be judged by the fifth or fourteenth amendment and deter-
mined by a balancing of the interests, a process that allows employ-
ees to challenge government action by a showing of particular harm
that could be remedied by a not overburdening adjustment in gov-
ernment procedures.
79. See note 17 supra.
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